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HUNTING AND POSTING
ON PRIVATE LAND IN AMERICA
MARK R. SIGMON
INTRODUCTION
Rod Froelich, owner of seventy-five hundred acres in Sioux
County, North Dakota, was tired of having hunters enter his land to
hunt without his permission. Froelich had not posted “no hunting”
signs on his land, which under the common reading of the state’s
posting statute meant that hunters were not obligated to seek his
permission to hunt.1 As a member of the North Dakota House of
Representatives, he sponsored legislation that would have required
hunters to get permission from landowners before hunting on private
land.2 When the legislation failed, Froelich, with the support of the
North Dakota Stockmen’s Association3 and the North Dakota Farm
4
Bureau, sued the governor and the director of the Game and Fish
Department of North Dakota, seeking a declaratory judgment that
hunters must have landowner permission before hunting on private
land.5 In moving for summary judgment, Froelich argued that the
posting statute, which provided for a criminal penalty if a hunter
entered posted land, did not abrogate his common law right to
exclude and his civil trespass remedy to enforce that right on
unposted land.6 He further argued that if the statute was interpreted
to effect such an abrogation—which was the common reading—it
Copyright © 2004 by Mark R. Sigmon.
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-18 (2002); see also infra note 58 (detailing other state
posting statutes).
2. H.R. 1278, 57th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2001); Dale Wetzel, Suit Seeks to Bar
Hunters from Unposted Private Land, BISMARCK TRIB. (North Dakota), May 28, 2003, at C6.
3. Press Release, North Dakota Stockmen’s Association, Stockmen’s Association
Supports Trespass Lawsuit (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.ndstockmen.org/
images/Trespasslawsuit.htm.
4. Press Release, North Dakota Farm Bureau, NDFB 2004 Priority Issues (Jan. 29, 2004)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
5. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4–5, Froelich v. Hoeven, No. 03-C0709 (Sioux County, N.D. filed May 21, 2003).
6. Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–3,
Froelich (No. 03-C-0709) [hereinafter Froelich Brief].
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7
would amount to an unconstitutional taking. In reply, the defendants
simply relied on the existence and history of the posting statute to
support their position that the public could hunt on unposted land
without permission, free from any civil or criminal sanction.8 They
further stated in a newspaper article that, “The assumption that
unposted land is open for hunting has been the case for decades, if
not since statehood.”9 The court deemed Froelich’s complaint a
request for an improper advisory opinion and granted summary
judgment for the defendants, declining to reach the merits of the
case.10
The year before Froelich filed his suit, an Arizona landowner
mounted a similar protest before an Arizona House of
11
Representatives committee, lobbying in support of a bill to repeal
12
Arizona’s recently enacted posting statute. Although agreeing that
the statute clearly abrogated a landowner’s civil trespass remedy
against people hunting on unposted land, she argued that it unfairly
undermined private property rights.13 In hearings before the
committee, she stated that proper posting under the statute was
difficult if not impossible, that some hunters knock down “no
hunting” posts, that hunters were often dangerous, and that, in the
end, the state’s posting law was simply inimical to private property
rights.14 Three other landowners testified similarly.15 Members of the
Arizona Game and Fish Commission, the Arizona Wildlife
Federation, and the National Rifle Association argued in response
that the posting law was a reasonable “compromise” between the

7. Id.
8. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or Alternative
Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–7, Froelich (No. 03-C-0709) [hereinafter North Dakota
Brief]; see id. at 15–16, 18–19 (arguing that the legislative adoption of the posting statutes at
issue excludes the operation of any common law principles and that the courts have no authority
to rewrite the statutes).
9. Wetzel, supra note 2.
10. Froelich, No. 03-C-0709, slip op. at 4 (Sioux County, N.D. May 3, 2004).
11. Hunters Trespassing: Hearing on H.B. 2592 Before the House Comm. on Military,
Veterans Affairs, and Aviation, 45th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2002) [hereinafter Hearing], available
at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/45leg/2r/comm_min/house/0321mvaa.doc.htm.
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304 (West Supp. 2004).
13. Hearing, supra note 11 (statement of Anna Marsob).
14. Id. (statement of Anna Marsob).
15. Id. (statements of Nancy Laizure, Paul Oiefenderfer, and Judith Heauser).
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16
rights of hunters and landowners. After a lively debate, the bill
17
failed.
These two conflicts revolve around state posting statutes—
statutes that require private landowners desiring to exclude hunters
from their land to post “no hunting” signs. As an initial matter, as this
Note later shows, Froelich’s argument that the statutes are only
criminal and therefore do not affect landowners’ civil remedies is
unavailing—the posting statutes actually make hunting on unposted
land perfectly “legal.” In this way, the statutes sacrifice the rights of
landowners for the sake of hunting, a sacrifice that seems increasingly
unreasonable as society changes. For this reason, states or
municipalities should eliminate or significantly change these statutes.
Part I of this Note analyzes the history behind the statutes, from
medieval English hunting laws to the rise of American statutes
designed to ensure that everyone, not just the rich and landed, could
hunt. Part II catalogues the current statutes, discussing the variations
among them and how secondary sources characterize the balance of
rights between hunters and landowners. Part III notes several
problems with the current statutes; specifically, it recognizes the
inherent conflict that the statutes create between the rights of hunters
and landowners and analyzes landowners’ compelling, but likely
unsuccessful, legal arguments against the statutes. Part III then
describes certain changes in society since the posting statutes were
first conceived and explains how those changes may undermine both
the statutes’ rationale and their intended effects. Part IV suggests
that, because judicial remedies seem unlikely, state legislatures or
municipalities in the twenty-nine states with posting requirements
should change their statutes (or common law requirements18) to
require explicit landowner permission to hunt on private land, as
twenty-one states already do. Failing the adoption of such a
requirement, Part IV suggests several alternative improvements to
the posting statutes.

16. Id. (statements of Hays Gilstrop, Ariz. Game & Fish Comm’n; Joe Carter, Ariz. Game
& Fish Comm’n; Darren LaSorte, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n; and Jack Simon, Ariz. Wildlife Fed’n).
17. See id. (noting that the bill failed by a roll-call vote of 0-8-0-2).
18. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining that the common law posting
requirements of Maine and Louisiana are similar to the statutory posting requirements of
twenty-seven other states).
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO HUNT ON PRIVATE LAND IN
AMERICA
A. The English Law as It Arrived in Colonial America
In England, before and during the era of the American colonies,
19
hunting and trapping were rights reserved for members of the
wealthy, and usually landed, class.20 In 1389, hunting was
21
characterized as a “gentleman’s game,” and eventually a scheme of
qualification statutes arose to grant only leading citizens the right to
hunt.22 These qualification statutes were not justified on the theory
that only landowners were entitled to the game on their land, for
some statutes qualified prominent citizens regardless of whether they
owned any land.23 Rather, the statutes were explicitly justified—at
least in part—on the rationale that hunting was an “amusing
diversion” that kept members of the lower class from pursuing more
important work.24 Parliament was “[d]eaf to the plea that game might
nourish the poor,” and the English game laws “ensured that the poor

19. Unless this Note states explicitly that it is dealing with only hunting or trapping, it will
discuss both under the general term “hunting.” American law generally treats hunting and
trapping similarly, whereas fishing laws are often of a different nature. See RUTH S. MUSGRAVE
& MARY ANNE STEIN, STATE WILDLIFE LAWS HANDBOOK 47–720 (1993) (describing the
hunting, trapping, and fishing laws of all fifty states). But see infra notes 75–76 and
accompanying text (discussing statutes that treat hunting and trapping differently). This Note
does not treat the vast, complex array of fishing laws.
20. See THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 8–10, 19 (1980) (noting that a goal
of early English wildlife regulation was to secure “unequal distribution of the right to utilize
wildlife,” that early English game law aimed “to beggar the powerless,” and that “landed wealth
and high social standing” were requirements for hunters). Professor Lund’s book—based in part
on his articles British Wildlife Law Before the American Revolution: Lessons from the Past, 74
MICH. L. REV. 49 (1975), and Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703 (1976)—
provides a detailed history of American game law and is the source upon which Part I draws
heavily.
21. 13 Rich. 2, c. 13, § 1 (1389) (Eng.); LUND, supra note 20, at 8.
22. See LUND, supra note 20, at 8 (“[Q]ualification statutes allowed only prominent citizens
to take game, to possess certain weapons and, ultimately, to eat certain animals.”). The statutes
often required hunters to have a certain level of wealth or a hereditary title to hunt. Id.
Eventually, in 1831, the qualification statutes were abandoned in favor of a new statute
permitting all people who purchased licenses to hunt on their own land or on the land of others
with permission from the owners. Game Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, §§ 1, 6 (1831) (Eng.).
23. LUND, supra note 20, at 10 & n.58 (citing 1 Jam., c. 27, § 2 (1604) (Eng.), which allowed
hunting by persons of “higher degree”). In addition, some “owners of properties worth less than
the statutory amount who were equally subject to wildlife depredations were not qualified to kill
the damaging animals.” Id. at 10.
24. Id.
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could neither consume game, nor interfere with the beasts that
25
ravaged their crops.”
Although the qualification statutes were not based on the theory
that solely landowners were entitled to game on their private land, in
eighteenth-century England an academic debate raged regarding
whether, nonetheless, there was truth to this theory. Railing against
this view, Blackstone argued that the landed had no inherent right to
the game on their land; he argued that whatever right the landed had
to take game on their own land was based on royal grants and that the
“right of taking and destroying game belongs exclusively to the
king.”26 As such, Blackstone believed that the sovereign could confer
upon (or deny to) anyone, rich or poor, the right to take game27—a
theory that came to be called “free taking.”28 This is not to say that
Blackstone denied that landowners could exclude hunters as
29
trespassers; Blackstone simply believed that title to ferae naturae was
vested in the sovereign, not the landowner, and thus that the
30
sovereign had discretion to restrict or control hunting. On the other
side of the debate was Professor Edward Christian, an editor of
Blackstone’s Commentaries.31 Christian argued that, although the king
could travel wherever he wished, he had no more right to the game on
32
a citizen’s land than to the crops on that land. Professor Christian,
then, believed that landowners had the exclusive right to the game on
their land.
25. Id. at 19.
26. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *417; LUND, supra note 20, at 21.
27. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *417–18.
28. LUND, supra note 20, at 20–21.
29. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *411 (noting that English law allowed restraints
on hunting, one common restraint being a general prohibition against “entering on another
man’s grounds, for any cause, without the owner’s leave”); see also 3 id. at *209–10:
Every unwarrantable entry on another’s soil the law entitles a trespass by breaking his
close . . . . For every man’s land is in the eye of the law enclosed and set apart from his
neighbor’s: and that either by a visible and material fence . . . or, by an ideal invisible
boundary, existing only in the contemplation of the law . . . .
LUND, supra note 20, at 23 (explaining that, according to Blackstone, “the civil law denied the
landowner’s property interest in wildlife” and, as such, “trespassers acquired good title to the
animals they poached” (emphasis added)).
30. See LUND, supra note 20, at 22 (“The power to make [grants to take game] . . .
established the king’s right as exclusive; had it been otherwise, . . . the landowner grantees
would have antecedently enjoyed the rights the king appeared to bestow.”).
31. See id. at 21 (stating that Blackstone’s support for “free taking” and Professor
Christian’s support for the “landed’s authority” placed them at opposite ends of the spectrum in
the English debate about the “landed’s claim to wildlife”).
32. Id. at 22.
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B. The American Reaction
Had Professor Christian’s theory prevailed in America,
landowners could have excluded hunters from their land simply by
claiming a property right in the animals themselves. But it was
Blackstone’s theory that prevailed in the new colonies, where
33
geography made “free taking” the “logical policy.” Unlike in
England, there was little danger that wildlife would be overharvested.
In addition, game was arguably more necessary for early Americans
than it was for their English counterparts because rural America, with
its frontier, required more of a subsistence lifestyle. To the extent that
wild animals impeded farming, which occupied a greater portion of
land in the colonies than in England, it was more necessary to control
the population of certain animals.34 Thus, free taking—encompassing
the idea that landowners did not own the game on their land, but not
the idea that landowners were powerless to exclude trespassers—took
hold.
To exclude hunters from their private land, landowners initially
offered two arguments consistent with the theory of free taking. The
first argument was that their right to wildlife was based not merely on
their titles to land, but on royal grants of exclusive hunting rights.35
Early American courts countered this argument by distinguishing
sovereign rights from property rights, reasoning that sovereign rights
“inhered indefeasibly in the powers of government.”36 The courts
further characterized the conveyance of such rights over game to give
landowners only the powers of a trustee, with the benefit of wildlife
accruing to all citizens. Such powers were inalienable, so the authority
over wildlife remained vested in the government.37 The second

33. Id. at 20.
34. See id. at 19 (stating that colonial policies controlling the hunting of wildlife sought to
produce “a sustained yield of game” and “to serve agriculture by exterminating vermin”).
35. Id. at 25; see, e.g., First Grant to the Duke of York (1664), reprinted in 1 COLONIAL
LAWS OF NEW YORK 1 (Albany, N.Y., James Lyon 1896) (providing an example of such a
grant); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 4–8 (1821) (summarizing, then rejecting, plaintiff’s
argument that state regulation of hunting and fishing in a tidal area was improper in light of a
royal grant of hunting rights to the plaintiff).
36. LUND, supra note 20, at 26.
37. Id.; Mundy, 6 N.J.L. at 71–73, 77 (explaining that the title to “common property [wild
beasts]” is “still, though this title, strictly speaking . . . in the sovereign, yet the use is common to
all the people”). This theory later became known as the “state ownership doctrine.” See Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–39 (1979) (reaffirming the states’ power over wildlife on
grounds other than the state ownership doctrine and noting that the state ownership doctrine
had been “eroded to the point of virtual extinction”); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28
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argument, aimed at excluding nonlandowning hunters, was that
landowners possessed status privileges similar to those exemplified by
38
the English qualification laws. This argument was easier to
overcome: early American courts simply rejected the idea as being
un-American.39
Notwithstanding the two developments described above, private
landowners could still have excluded hunters simply by claiming that
hunters were trespassers. Because the theory of free taking did not
encompass the idea that hunters had the right to enter private land,40
American lawmakers, to ensure that hunting was available to
everyone, set about creating this new American right. It had its
beginnings in seventeenth-century laws that allowed New Englanders
to cross undeveloped private land41 to fish or hunt fowl on public
42
lakes. Such laws, however, only ensured that hunters could enter
undeveloped private land, not that hunters could actually take game
on such land. Early American lawmakers then turned their attention
to ensuring that hunters could do the latter.43 Through the use of

(1896) (giving a general description of the state ownership doctrine and the wide latitude of the
states to regulate hunting). But see John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding”
Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 365–68
(2003) (reconciling Geer with Hughes, and concluding that the state ownership doctrine is still
alive and well).
38. See LUND, supra note 20, at 26 (“Had the English qualification tests been considered
appropriate to American law, a hunting monopoly for the landed might have been established.”
(footnote omitted)).
39. Id.; see Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 5 (1840) (holding that such English privileges
were inconsistent with the spirit of this country’s institutions); Hallock v. Dominy, 14 N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 52, 55 (1876) (same). Despite this ideal, some American states did enact variations on the
English qualification laws. See LUND, supra note 20, at 26 (mentioning Virginia and
Pennsylvania laws that required a certain level of slave ownership or land ownership,
respectively, for particular hunting rights).
40. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining that Blackstone’s “free taking”
theory did not always insulate hunters from the offense of trespassing).
41. In early America, the law preferred agriculture over hunting. LUND, supra note 20, at
24. As a result, “[d]eveloped lands were spared [the incursions of hunters].” Id. Thus, the right
of hunters to cross private land to access public land was often limited to unenclosed or
undeveloped private land. See also infra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining that nine of
the current state posting statutes require posting only for undeveloped or unenclosed land). The
posting statutes and this Note use the terms “undeveloped” and “unenclosed” interchangeably.
42. Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes (1660), reprinted in COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS 170 (William H. Whitmore ed., Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1889); LUND,
supra note 20, at 24.
43. See LUND, supra note 20, at 25 (stating that early legislation “affirmed only the right to
enter unenclosed private lands, not to hunt on them,” and that “[t]he next step would be to seek
the right to take the game as well”).
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constitutional conventions, court decisions, and legislation, such a
right was born.
Strong advocates of hunting actually argued that the United
States Constitution should protect the right of citizens to enter onto
unenclosed land to hunt.44 Although that effort was clearly
unsuccessful, the citizens of two states—Pennsylvania and Vermont—
ratified constitutions recognizing and protecting such a right.45 Indeed,
46
in Pennsylvania, an earlier document from 1696 recognized the right.
The Vermont constitutional provision still exists, providing: “The
inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, to hunt
and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not inclosed, and
in like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters (not private
property) under proper regulations . . . .”47 The Supreme Court of
Vermont has recognized that Vermont’s constitutional provision
changed the English law by “extend[ing] rights to citizens which the
common law had not recognized” and by “recogniz[ing] rights to hunt
and fish . . . in what had previously been the landowner’s private
domain.”48

44. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
to Their Constituents, PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 3
HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145, 151 (1981); LUND, supra note
20, at 25.
45. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 43 (“The inhabitants of this state shall have liberty to fowl
and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed;
and in like manner to fish in all boatable waters, and others not private property.”); VT. CONST.
of 1777, § 39 (“That the inhabitants of this State, shall have liberty to hunt and fowl, in
seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on other lands (not enclosed;) [sic] and, in like
manner, to fish in all boatable and other waters, not private property . . . .”). Pennsylvania
ratified a new constitution in 1790 that did not include any such provision; Vermont’s provision
still exists, located at Section 67 of the Vermont Constitution. Note that both Pennsylvania and
Vermont are currently states in which landowners must post to exclude hunters from their land.
See discussion infra notes 58, 62–63 and accompanying text.
46. See FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1696), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, OR COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3070, 3075 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909):
That the inhabitants of this province and territories thereof, shall have liberty to fish
and hunt, upon the lands they hold, or all other lands therein, not inclosed, and to fish
in all waters in the said lands . . . in and belonging to this province and territories
thereof, with liberty to draw his, or their fish upon any man’s land, so as it be not to
the detriment or annoyance of the owner thereof . . . .
47. VT. CONST. § 67; see Cabot v. Thomas, 514 A.2d 1034, 1037–38 (Vt. 1986) (describing
and applying the constitutional provision); New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 35 A.
323, 328 (Vt. 1896) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (describing the history of the provision).
48. Cabot, 514 A.2d at 1037–38.
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Even in states without constitutional provisions protecting the
right to hunt on unenclosed land, early state courts recognized this
49
right. In an early South Carolina case, the court held that “[t]he
hunting of wild animals in the forests, and unenclosed lands of this
country, is as ancient as its settlement, [and] the right to do so coeval
therewith; [and] the owner of the soil, while his lands are unenclosed,
can not prohibit the exercise of it to others.”50 Contrary to the law as
it exists generally today,51 this South Carolina court held not only that
there was a presumption that unenclosed land was open to hunters
but further that landowners could not even exclude hunters once they
discovered their presence.52 The Supreme Court of the United States,
53
in McKee v. Gratz, also recognized a presumption in American law
that unenclosed land was open to hunters:
The strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close
must be taken to be mitigated by common understanding with
regard to the large expanses of unenclosed and uncultivated land in
many parts at least of this country. Over these it is customary to
wander, shoot and fish at will until the owner sees fit to prohibit it.
54
A license may be implied from the habits of the country.

49. M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 244 (1818).
50. Id. Although “the decision was subsequently explained as either an imprecise
treatment of trespass without injury, or as a judicial effort to steer clear of a ‘sea of petty
litigation,’ the court did not shrink from the view that an owner had to enclose his property to
exclude hunters.” LUND, supra note 20, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
51. See infra Part II.A (describing the posting statutes).
52. M’Conico, 9 S.C.L. at 246:
Having come to the conclusion, that it is the right of the inhabitants to hunt on
unenclosed lands, I need not attempt to prove that the dissent or disapprobation of
the owner cannot deprive him of it; for I am sure it never yet entered the mind of any
man, that a right which the law gives, can be defeated at the mere will and caprice of
an individual.
53. 260 U.S. 127 (1922).
54. Id. at 136. Justice Thurgood Marshall reaffirmed this view more than sixty years later in
a portion of his dissent agreeing with the majority in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984):
Still other spaces are, by positive law and social convention, presumed accessible to
members of the public unless the owner manifests his intention to exclude them.
Undeveloped land falls into the last-mentioned category. If a person has not
marked the boundaries of his fields or woods in a way that informs passersby that
they are not welcome, he cannot object if members of the public enter onto the
property.
Id. at 193–94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Oliver, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the “open
fields” doctrine of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a doctrine whereby governmental
investigation of certain undeveloped land is generally not considered a “search” for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Id. at 184.
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McKee is an instructive case because in it the Court recognized that
American law had changed from the English common law. The Court
held that, because of the differences between the two nations, a
different presumption had taken hold in America—that unenclosed
land was presumed open to hunters.
In addition to these constitutional and judicial approaches, a
third method used to ensure hunters’ access to private land was the
enactment of posting statutes forcing landowners to post signs that
hunting was not permitted.55 These statutes fostered the presumption
that private land was open to hunters and required affirmative acts on
the part of landowners to exclude hunters. Such statutes are currently
the primary source of hunters’ right to hunt on private land in almost
every state that recognizes such a right. The following Part examines
these statutes in detail.
II. THE CURRENT LAW OF HUNTING
ON PRIVATE LAND IN AMERICA
A. The Posting Statutes
The current state of American hunting law reflects the history of
the right to hunt in this nation. Most states now have statutes
requiring landowners to post their land to exclude hunters; the other
states have statutes requiring hunters to get explicit permission from
landowners before they hunt.56 Even Vermont, which has a
constitutional provision granting hunters the right to hunt on
57
unenclosed private land, has a posting statute.
As of this Note’s publication, twenty-nine states require posting
to exclude hunters. Twenty-four of these states require posting by
58
statutes that pertain explicitly to hunting, although there are many

55. See LUND, supra note 20, at 70–72 (“In early American law, rules that required the
landowner to post his property with notices prohibiting entry generally secured the goal of free
access of takers to wilderness.”).
56. For a general discussion of state laws as of 1993, including state-by-state wildlife law
summaries, see MUSGRAVE & STEIN, supra note 19.
57. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5201 (1997); see Cabot v. Thomas, 514 A.2d 1034, 1036–38 (Vt.
1986) (recognizing the coexistence of the constitutional provision and the statute and implicitly
finding no contradiction); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
58. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304 (West
Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-11-403 (Michie 2003); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2016
(West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.09 (West Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 36-1602 (Michie
2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-1013 (2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, § 36 (Law. Co-op. 2001);
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59
variations among the statutes. Of these twenty-four states, nine
require posting only for unenclosed/uncultivated land;60 the theory in
these states is that enclosed/cultivated land is already “posted” and
61
that agriculture should be spared the depredations of hunters. Three
states, while lacking statutes specifically requiring that landowners
post to exclude hunters, have general trespass statutes requiring that
landowners post to exclude people from private land for any reason,62
including to exclude hunters.63 Thus, twenty-seven of the twenty-nine

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73102 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001 (West Supp.
2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-79 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 503.240 (Michie 1995); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:4 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:7-1 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-46 (Michie 1995); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-2113 (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-159.6 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-18 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 5-202 (West
Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 498.120 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-4 (2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 23-20-14 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5201 (1997); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-7
(Michie 2002). Alaska’s posting statute, ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350, although general in nature,
specifically permits landowners to post “no hunting” signs, so this Note includes it among the
twenty-four states with posting statutes specific to hunting. The same is true for New
Hampshire’s statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:4. Under Oklahoma’s posting statute, posting
is not required for land “occupied” by the resident. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 5-202. Oregon’s statute seemingly goes further and does not even mention posting as a means
to delineate a landowner’s property—it requires, for example, a wire or hedge. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 498.120. Notwithstanding this language, however, it is almost certain that posting would count
as such a means. See O’Brien v. Eugene Chem. Exps., Inc., 664 P.2d 1106, 288–90 (Or. App.
1983) (holding that posting is a means to mark one’s property boundaries). This Note does not
address the laws of the District of Columbia because the District is quite small and presumably
has little land available for hunting.
59. See infra notes 68–87 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 58 (citing the statutes of Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah). North Dakota does not require posting for land
on which cereal crops are grown. N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-22.
61. See supra note 41 (discussing the favored status of agriculture).
62. Pennsylvania’s statute, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503 (West 2000), is based on the
Model Penal Code’s trespass provision, which does not specifically mention hunting but
requires posting (or fencing or enclosing) to exclude all trespassers from land (posting is not
required for buildings and occupied structures). See also infra notes 88–89 and accompanying
text (discussing the Model Penal Code). Washington’s statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.52.010 (West 2000), also requires posting to exclude all trespassers unless the land is
fenced or otherwise enclosed “in a manner designed to exclude intruders . . . .” Wisconsin’s
statute, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.13 (West Supp. 2004), requires posting (or oral or written notice)
to exclude all trespassers.
63. Pennsylvania courts generally hold that posting is required to exclude hunters. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Sweeley, 29 Pa. D. & C.4th 426, 433 (C.P. 1995) (“Open lands that are not
posted or fenced off are presumed open for recreational use by the public, especially in rural
counties where hunting and outdoor activities are common.”). A Washington statute describing
unlawful posting specifically mentions “signs preventing hunting,” WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 77.15.220 (West 2001), and the Supreme Court of Washington has assumed that posting is
required to exclude hunters, Hickle v. Whitney Farms, Inc., 64 P.3d 1244, 1245 (Wash. 2003).

SIGMON FINAL.DOC

560

6/6/2005 10:38 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:549

states that require posting do so by statute. Although the other states
that require posting, Maine and Louisiana, lack statutes that apply to
posting, in both states courts nevertheless presume that unposted land
64
is open to hunters. The remaining twenty-one states, which do not
require posting, all have statutes requiring hunters to obtain
65
landowner permission before hunting on private land. Three of these
states require that permission be written.66 All twenty-one of these
states require permission for entry onto any kind of private land,
enclosed or unenclosed, developed or undeveloped.

Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has assumed that posting is required to exclude
hunters. Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 547 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Wis. 1996).
64. See Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 804 A.2d 364, 372 (Me. 2002) (“The
presumption that public recreational uses of open, unposted land are permissive applies equally
to . . . hunters and snowmobilers crossing a cultivated field after the harvest . . . .”).
Additionally, Maine does have a specific posting statute for its saltwater islands. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 7556–7557 (West 2003). Until very recently Louisiana had an explicit
statute that required posting for all land, but it was repealed by 2003 LA. ACTS 802 in an effort
to simplify the state’s trespass laws. The new, general trespass statute is LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:63 (West 2004), which allows landowner permission to be “implied.” It is highly likely that
the statutory change was meant not to alter the posting requirement that existed previously.
65. ALA. CODE § 9-11-241 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-6-116 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-109 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 714 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1
(2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 183D-26 (2001); 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33(t) (West 2004);
IND. CODE ANN. § 14-22-10-1 (Michie 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.7(2)(a) (West 2003); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.092 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. II § 10-411
(Supp. 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.150 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-304 (2003);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-722 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.17 (West Supp. 2004); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-610 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 41-9-1 (Michie 2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-106 (1995); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 61.022 (Vernon 2002);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-132 (Michie 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-305 (Michie 2003).
Connecticut requires posting to exclude nonhunting trespassers, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a109, but posting is not required to exclude hunters, id. § 26-65. In Georgia, the default rule is
that hunters must get permission from landowners, and landowners can also post their land so
that hunters must obtain and carry written permission to hunt. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1.
Tennessee has a similar statute, requiring permission but also giving landowners the option of
posting “hunting by written permission only” signs. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-106. Missouri has
a “classic” strict liability general trespass statute, MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.150, but the comment
to the 1973 proposed code mentions hunting specifically: “[The statute] is directed at persons
who do not bother to determine whether they are hunting . . . on the property of another.” A
hunter who enters onto unposted land without permission is guilty of second-degree trespass, an
infraction. If, however, the land is posted, the hunter is guilty of first-degree trespass, a
misdemeanor. Id. § 569.140.
66. See supra note 65 (citing the statutes of Alabama, Maryland, and Ohio).
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67
The twenty-seven posting statutes have several characteristics
and variations worth mentioning. Of primary interest is the great
specificity with which most statutes define legally sufficient posting.
Most states set an exact number of signs that must be posted, their
size, what they must say, and even their height off of the ground and
their color. A typical requirement for posting is Arizona’s statute,
which requires that “notices or signboards” be “not less than eight
[inches] by eleven inches with plainly legible wording in capital and
bold-faced lettering at least one inch high,” and that such notices

[b]e conspicuously placed on a structure or post at least four feet
above ground at all points of vehicular access, at all property or
fence corners and at intervals of not more than one-quarter mile
along the property boundary, except that a post with one hundred
square inches or more of orange paint may serve as the interval
notices between property or fence corners and points of vehicular
access. The orange paint shall be clearly visible and shall cover the
entire aboveground surface of the post facing outward and on both
68
lateral sides from the closed area.

New Mexico has an odd requirement that makes excluding hunters
even more difficult: not only must signs be posted in Spanish as well
as English, but notice must be published “for three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the
69
premises are situated.” The posting requirements, then, are not easy
for landowners to fulfill but are specific and exacting.
Although all of the posting statutes allow landowners to prohibit
hunting, many of them also allow landowners to prohibit other

67. Although the ensuing discussion is phrased in terms of the posting “statutes,” the
nonstatutory posting requirements of Maine and Louisiana are similar to requirements of the
twenty-seven statutes. Thus, this Note’s discussion of the statutes also applies to these two
states.
68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304 (West Supp. 2004). As exemplified by the Arizona
statute, many of the posting statutes are concerned particularly with posts where roads enter a
parcel of land. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-6 (Michie 1995) (“In the event a public road
enters or crosses the enclosure or pasture, an additional notice shall be posted conspicuously
within three hundred yards of the point where each public road enters the posted property.”).
Some states require that the landowner’s address be on the sign. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 11-2111(2) (McKinney 1997) (“Signs shall bear the name and address of the
owner, lawful occupant, or other person or organization authorized to post the protected
area.”). California, although specifying the number of signs that must be posted (three to a mile
along all boundaries), is less stringent regarding what the signs must look like. See CAL. FISH &
GAME CODE § 2016 (West 1998) (“Such signs may be of any size and wording . . . .”).
69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-6.
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activities. Some of the statutes permit landowners to post “no
trespassing” signs instead of “no hunting” signs, meaning that
70
landowners may prohibit trespass for any reason. Other statutes
allow landowners to post prohibitions on other specific activities, such
as “no digging.”71 Michigan’s statute defines the act of posting as
prohibiting all “recreational activity,” which includes hunting and
72
apparently other outdoor activities as well. Minnesota’s statute
similarly defines the act of posting as prohibiting “[o]utdoor
recreation,” which it defines as “any voluntary activity, including
hunting, fishing, trapping, boating, hiking, camping, and engaging in
winter sports, which is conducted primarily for the purposes of
pleasure, rest, or relaxation and is dependent upon or derives its
principal benefit from natural surroundings.”73 Conversely, some state
courts have construed their posting statutes such that “no hunting”
74
signs prohibit only hunting and not other activities.
Although most posting statutes apply to trapping as well as
hunting, some differentiate trapping and subject it to harsher rules;
presumably this is because trapping can be especially dangerous for
landowners, who do not know the presence and location of traps, and
because the act of placing and leaving traps on land is somewhat more
75
invasive than a hunter’s temporary presence on land. Mississippi and
North Dakota,76 for instance, although requiring posting to exclude
hunters, mandate that trappers get explicit permission from
landowners, notwithstanding the absence of postings.

70. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:4 (1996).
71. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(b)(6) (Michie 2002). Some of the twenty-one state
statutes that require explicit permission to hunt also require explicit permission for other
activities. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-610 (Law. Co-op. 2003) (requiring explicit
landowner permission for entry onto land to gather fruit, flowers, shrubbery, etc., or to cut
timber).
72. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73102 (West 1999).
73. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001(1a) (West Supp. 2004).
74. E.g., State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015, 1024 (Or. 1988) (“In the present case, the
defendants . . . had blocked access to their property with cables and posted ‘No Hunting’ signs.
However, on this record there was no objective reason for the [“trespassers”] to believe that, in
addition to the restriction on hunting, other uses such as hiking were forbidden.”).
75. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-13 (2003). This is a separate statute from Mississippi’s general
posting statute, supra note 58.
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-18 (2002). This statute requires that permission be written.
Id. A special concern for the dangers of trapping is also manifest in the statutes of the twentyone “nonposting” states, which require landowner permission prior to hunting: Montana, for
instance, requires that permission to trap be written, whereas permission to hunt need not be
written. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-604 (2003).
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Generally, the posting statutes do not preclude landowners’ right
to exclude personally hunters whom they happen to encounter on
their land. That is, even on unposted land in states with posting
statutes, if landowners see hunters and tell them to leave, the hunters
77
must leave. On the other hand, the posting statutes generally allow
landowners to give specific hunters permission to hunt while still
78
excluding the general population of hunters with postings. The
statutes do not address situations in which, for whatever reason,
hunters see no postings at a given point in time but nevertheless know
that landowners do not want hunting on their land.
The majority of the posting statutes are criminal statutes that
penalize trespassers who hunt on posted land, although a few are
unclear about whether they provide a criminal penalty or create a
79
80
civil remedy. At least one seems to do the latter. Virginia has an
odd criminal statute: it provides that, although a hunter must get
explicit permission to hunt on private land (and thus, for analytical
purposes, this Note classified it above as one of the twenty-one
“nonposting” state statutes), a hunter who trespasses on unposted
land is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor whereas a hunter who
trespasses on posted land is guilty of a more serious Class 3
77. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(b) (Michie 2002) (stating that landowners can give
notice against trespass directly or by posting); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-79 (2003) (same).
However, the posting statute of at least one state, Arizona, seems to indicate the contrary: “The
entry of any person for the taking of wildlife shall not be grounds for an action for trespassing
unless the land has been posted pursuant to this section.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304(D)
(West Supp. 2004). The statutes of a few states are unclear in that they do not explicitly state
that a landowner can or cannot personally exclude a hunter. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131,
§ 36 (Law. Co-op. 2001) (stating that a person cannot hunt on private land without permission if
the land is posted, but not stating whether a landowner can give personal notice against
trespass).
78. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304 (requiring hunters to get written permission
if land is posted); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2016 (West 1998) (same); IDAHO CODE § 36-1602
(Michie 2002) (requiring hunters to get permission if land is posted); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131,
§ 36 (same).
79. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-1013 (2000) (stating that the act of hunting on posted
land is “unlawful”). Some of the statutes are unclear because they are not in distinctly criminal
or civil codes but rather in fish and wildlife codes. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2016
(imposing the same requirement as the Kansas statute, but in a provision originally derived
from the California penal code). New Jersey’s statute is unclear because it provides for “a civil
penalty of not less than $100.00 nor more than $200.00 for the first offense” but does not
indicate whether it is the state or private citizens who may bring suit under the provision. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 23:7-1 (West 1997).
80. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304(D) (“The entry of any person for the taking of
wildlife shall not be grounds for an action for trespassing unless the land has been posted
pursuant to this section.”).
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81

misdemeanor. In addition to providing a criminal penalty or creating
a civil remedy, many posting statutes penalize trespassing hunters by
82
revoking their hunting licenses. Finally, a few of the criminal posting
statutes require that landowners themselves complain before the state
will commence prosecution.83
Some of the posting statutes also have exceptions for hunters
who pursue wounded animals onto posted land. Kansas, for instance,
allows the pursuit of wounded game onto posted land, unless and
until landowners instruct hunters to leave.84 Even some of the
nonposting state statutes that require explicit permission from the
85
landowner provide for such an exception. Similarly, a few posting
statutes have exceptions for hunters who retrieve hunting dogs from
posted land.86
Finally, some of the posting statutes have stricter requirements
for hunters in close proximity to buildings, animals, or other sensitive
areas; in most cases, hunting in such areas requires affirmative
landowner permission. Minnesota, for instance, although mandating
posting to exclude hunters from undeveloped land, requires hunters
to obtain written permission to hunt with a firearm within five
hundred feet of any building occupied by a human or animal,
including corrals or stockades.87
B. Other Authorities and State Laws
Various secondary sources provide general insight about whether
and when landowners must post to exclude hunters. The Model Penal
Code’s criminal trespass provision, on which Pennsylvania’s trespass
88
statute is based, requires landowners to post nonfenced land
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-132 (Michie 2004).
82. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:7-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-14(3) (2003).
83. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 5-202 (West Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 498.120
(2003); see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-159.6 (2003) (applying only in two counties).
84. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-1013(c); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001 (West Supp.
2004) (requiring hunters to leave immediately after retrieving wounded animals); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 20.1-01-19 (2002) (creating an absolute right for a hunter to enter posted land to
retrieve game “shot or killed on land where the person had a lawful right to hunt”).
85. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.7(2)(a) (West 2003) (requiring, however, that the
hunters be unarmed).
86. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73102 (West 1999) (stating that hunters
cannot possess firearms when retrieving dogs); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001 (stating that
hunters must leave immediately after retrieving dogs).
87. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001(7).
88. See supra note 62.
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(excluding buildings and occupied structures) to exclude any would89
be trespassers, including hunters. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
states that,
[I]f. . . it is the custom in wooded or rural areas to permit the public
to go hunting on private land . . . , anyone who goes hunting . . . may
reasonably assume, in the absence of posted notice or other
manifestation to the contrary, that there is the customary consent to
90
his entry upon private land to hunt or fish.”

Corpus Juris Secundum notes that landowners generally have the sole
91
right to game on their land, but it also recognizes that many states
have criminal posting statutes92 and that custom sometimes allows
93
hunters to enter unenclosed land. American Jurisprudence, on the
other hand, states that a hunter in “pursuit” of game “may” be
deemed a trespasser regardless of posting but notes that states can
require landowners to post “no trespassing” signs for hunters
“retrieving wounded game.”94 Thus, these secondary sources seem
split about whether posting is required to exclude hunters.

89. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.2 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985). Comment 1 states that:
one or more of the following factors had to be shown in order to prove the offense:
notice . . . whether by personal communication or posting of signs; intention . . . to
hunt or shoot; entry by force . . . ; the fact that the land was of particular ownership or
use . . . ; the fact that the trespass was in a building or structure rather than on open
land.
Id. § 221.2 cmt. 1 (footnotes omitted). Despite the “one or more” language of the comment, the
text of the rule does not reflect the view that the intention to hunt or shoot is sufficient to state a
claim for trespass. In addition, the three states whose laws the comment cites to support the
“intention . . . to hunt or shoot” factor all require a landowner to post to exclude hunters. Id.
§ 221.2 cmt. 1 n.2.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. d (1979). Various other Restatement
provisions also address posting. For example, a failure to post is not considered landowner
consent in the context of landowner liability to trespassers who habitually and notoriously
disregard such posts. Id. § 330 cmt. c.
91. 38 C.J.S. Game § 5 (2003).
92. Id. § 59.
93. See id. § 52 (“A license to hunt does not confer any right on the holder to go upon lands
owned by another, or to enter the enclosure of another, without his permission. In the case of
unenclosed land, however, the right has sometimes been conferred by immemorial usage or by
constitutional provision.” (footnotes omitted)).
94. 35A AM. JUR. 2D Fish, Game, and Wildlife Conservation § 22 (2001). “Pursuit” is not
specifically defined; however, if hunters can be deemed trespassers merely for chasing game,
surely they can be deemed trespassers for entering private land to hunt when not in the midst of
a chase.
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Many states also have other, ancillary statutes relating to this
issue. Because most states have a stated policy of encouraging
95
hunting, and thus encouraging private landowners to allow hunting
on their land, some states have provided incentives for landowners
not to post their land (and in states where posting is not required, for
landowners to give permission to hunters).96 The incentives generally
take two forms: protecting landowners from damage done by hunters
and from liability for injuries suffered by hunters, and directly
rewarding landowners for allowing hunting on their land.97
To protect landowners from damage caused by hunters, some
states provide for the revocation of hunting licenses if hunters
98
damage property. Some statutes state that a hunter is liable to
landowners for any damage done to their land.99 Other statutes simply
state, without specifying a penalty, that hunters shall not do any
100
damage to land. Still other states have general laws prohibiting
certain common trespass offenses that hunters commonly commit,
101
such as leaving a gate open. A few states have especially stringent
punishments for hunters who accidentally kill livestock;102 New
Hampshire actually requires the state to pay for livestock accidentally
103
killed during deer hunting season. Finally, although state law
regarding landowners’ liability for injuries to people on their land is a
separate, complex area of law that is generally protective of

95. See Patrick J. Cottriel, Comment, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century: Can
the Public Trust Doctrine Save an American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1258–60 (1996)
(describing the many state and federal statutes prohibiting harassment of hunters and the states’
interest in preserving the right to hunt).
96. LUND, supra note 20, at 71.
97. Id.
98. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-340 (West Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
503.185 (Michie Supp. 2003).
99. IDAHO CODE § 36-1602 (Michie 2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, § 61 (Law. Co-op.
2001).
100. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.092 (Banks-Baldwin 2002). This statute is from a
nonposting state, but it is instructive nonetheless.
101. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-101 (2002) (defining the failure to close a
previously unopened gate as criminal mischief, a misdemeanor). This is a statute from a
nonposting state, but it is instructive nonetheless.
102. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 36-1602 (making such an act a misdemeanor).
103. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425:10 (2002).
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104
landowners who do not invite people onto their land, some states
have created special statutes limiting landowner liability to hunters.105
States also directly reward landowners for not posting their land.
Some states provide owners of unposted land with wildlife for
stocking,106 and others provide such landowners with labor, materials,
and even plants for improving their land.107 Some states give aid in the
form of payments to owners of unposted land for damage done by
108
game animals. Wyoming provides a more direct form of incentive,
requiring hunters who kill deer, antelope, or elk on private land to
give landowners a coupon redeemable for thirteen dollars.109
California simply pays private landowners to open their land for
110
hunting. Even the United States Congress has considered such an
incentive: some Senators have proposed a bill that would provide
modest, per-acre payments from a $50 million federal fund to
landowners who voluntarily open their land to hunting.111
Finally, it bears repetition that state laws dealing with posting,
hunting, and related issues are varied and complex. As a result, each
state’s mix of laws is unique. Nonetheless, the overarching

104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 333–339 (1979) (stating that landowners
are generally not liable to uninvited guests on their land).
105. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212:34 (Supp. 2003) (stating that a landowner owes
“no duty of care to keep such premises safe for entry or use by others for hunting, fishing,
trapping,” or other recreational uses).
106. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:2-3 (West 1997).
107. E.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 11-0305(1), 11-0501(10)(a)–(c) (McKinney
Supp. 2004).
108. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 36-1108 (Michie Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 29.889 (West
2004); see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:22-a (2001) (allowing landowners to participate in
the wildlife damage control program only if their land is unposted or if their land is posted
“Hunting by Permission Only” and permission is reasonably granted).
109. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-105 (Michie 2003). Wyoming is a nonposting state; thus, the
incentive is actually directed at convincing landowners to give explicit permission to hunters.
The statute is instructive nonetheless.
110. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1573 (West 1998); see also Sportsman’s Guide to Access
Yes, at http://fishandgame.idaho.gov/hunt/access/2004accessyes.asp (describing Idaho’s “Access
Yes!” program, which pays landowners to open their land to hunting) (last visited Nov. 4, 2004)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
111. Voluntary Public Access and Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program Act of 2003, S. 1840,
108th Cong. § 3 (2003); see also Voluntary Public Access and Wildlife Habitat Incentive
Program Act of 2003, H.R. 3482, 108th Cong. (2003) (providing the House’s version
of this legislation); Press Release, Senator Kent Conrad, “Open Fields Incentives” Legislation
Offered by Conrad (Oct. 9, 2003) (summarizing the legislation), available at
http://conrad.senate.gov/~conrad/releases/03/10/2003A12901.html.
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presumption that landowners who do not post their land have opened
their property to hunters clearly exists in more than half of the states.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE POSTING STATUTES
A. Legal Arguments Against the Statutes
The posting statutes create an obvious problem: they pit the
rights of one group, hunters, against the rights of another group,
landowners. The rights of both groups are powerful. For hunters, the
right to hunt and trap on all land has its source in the early national
112
egalitarian desire to allow everyone to hunt. But landowners’ right
to exclude is a pillar of the common law; as the Supreme Court has
stated, this right is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property . . . .”113
Landowners wishing to argue that posting statutes unduly infringe
upon their property rights have two legal arguments: (1) that the
common law right to exclude is paramount, and that the posting
statutes do not interfere with that right or its civil enforcement; and
(2) that, if the posting statutes do interfere, they have created an
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.114 Both
of these arguments, however, are weak.
Landowners could argue that there is no inconsistency between
the common law and the posting statutes because the statutes simply
impose a criminal penalty against people trespassing on posted land;
they do not abrogate landowners’ civil remedy for trespass on
unposted land, at least in the majority of states where the posting
115
statutes are criminal. As Rod Froelich argued in North Dakota state
court, the common law protects landowners against intrusion by
providing both criminal penalties against trespassers and civil causes
of action for landowners.116 The United States Supreme Court has
stated that “the law of civil trespass . . . has always been recognized[]
by the common law in general . . . as a field quite distinct and separate

112. See supra Part I.B.
113. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that “private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation”). Various states also have constitutional provisions mirroring
the Fifth Amendment. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
115. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
116. Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 1–3.
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117
from criminal trespass,” and that civil and criminal sanctions for
injuries to property rights often coexist:

Petitioners make much of the fact that the 1793 Act contained
criminal penalties in arguing that the Act pre-empted common-law
actions. In property law, however, it is common to have criminal and
civil sanctions available for infringement of property rights, and for
government officials to use the police power to remove trespassers
118
from privately owned land.

This argument is buttressed further by the fact that criminal trespass
provisions, such as the one in the Model Penal Code, have
119
traditionally required that trespassers knowingly trespass, and
posting statutes are aimed at ensuring that hunters know when they
are trespassing. Finally, it can be said that “[c]riminal trespass statutes
do not afford a substitute for adequate civil remedies for trespass.”120
This argument, however, suffers from two problems. First, the
common law is not entirely clear about the specific issue of whether
landowners possess a civil remedy against hunters who enter
121
unposted land to hunt. Admittedly, the position of Blackstone, and
of the Supreme Court in cases such as Kaiser Aetna v. United States,122
is that a civil remedy does exist when it comes to trespass in general.
By contrast, however, sources such as the Restatement (Second) of
Torts123 and Corpus Juris Secundum124 indicate that under common
law hunters had the right to enter unposted land without explicit
landowner permission—thus precluding a civil remedy. The Supreme

117. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 357 (1964); see Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at
10 (citing Bouie and noting the distinction between civil and criminal trespass).
118. Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 239 (1985); see Froelich Brief,
supra note 6, at 10 (citing Oneida County and noting that “[t]he posting statute simply adds a
layer of criminal sanctions . . . without abrogating . . . preexisting civil sanctions”).
119. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.2 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); see also 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 177 (2003) (“Many criminal trespass
statutes require that notice or warning be given to a person that his presence on the premises is
prohibited, since many criminal statutes require that the trespass be knowingly committed.”
(footnotes omitted)).
120. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 166; see Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 12–13 (citing
American Jurisprudence 2d and arguing that criminal statutes are inadequate because
landowners cannot compel prosecutions for trespass).
121. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
122. 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. d (1979); supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
124. 38 C.J.S. Game § 5, 52, 59 (2003); supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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125
126
Court in McKee v. Gratz and Oliver v. United States, purporting to
describe the common law of the United States in general,127
apparently took this latter view. The question may well be one of
what exactly is the common law: did the common law that existed in
England at the time of the American Revolution survive in this
nation, or did American common law take a different path? Because
of this ambiguity, whether the common law provides a civil remedy
for trespass on unposted land is, at the very least, unclear.
Still more problematic is that, even if American common law
provides a civil remedy for trespass on unposted land, it seems clear
that state posting statutes aim to abrogate this remedy. As an initial
matter, legislatures certainly have the right to alter the common law
by statute.128 The general rule is that courts should construe statutes to
129
avoid any potential constitutional problem; however, when a statute
and its legislative history are clear, a court is unlikely to construe a
statute awkwardly simply to avoid such a problem.130 In the posting
context, although a construction of the posting statutes abrogating
131
any civil remedy might appear to cause a takings problem, any
construction that would allow a civil trespass remedy seems tortured
and would conflict with the history of the posting statutes. Although
the text of the statutes standing alone may be unclear about whether
a common law civil remedy survives the statutes’ enactment, the
history of the statutes is not: they were enacted to ensure that all
citizens had the right to hunt, even on the land of others, so long as
the land was unposted.132 In the Froelich case, for example, when
Froelich argued that the statutes were not designed to abrogate the
133
common law right of civil redress, the defendants flatly stated that

125. 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922); see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
126. 466 U.S. 170, 193–94 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra note 54 and
accompanying text. Although this proposition was clearest in Justice Marshall’s dissent in this
case, this portion of the dissent agreed with the Court majority.
127. Although the Court does not have the final word on the content of the common law of
any individual state, it is telling that the Supreme Court considers American common law to
allow hunting on unposted land.
128. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 15 (2004).
129. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).
130. See, e.g., U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (“We cannot press statutory construction
‘to the point of disingenuous evasion’ even to avoid a constitutional question.” (citations
omitted)).
131. See infra notes 137–53 and accompanying text.
132. See supra Part II.B.
133. Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 13.
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“[t]he law of trespass and [the] ‘posting’ requirements are plainly set
134
out” to allow hunters to enter unposted, private land, and that
“[t]he assumption that unposted land is open for hunting has been the
135
case for decades, if not since statehood.” Owners of unposted land
could sue hunters if courts were willing to construe posting statutes to
provide only criminal sanctions for trespass on posted land. But this is
unlikely because such a statutory construction would directly conflict
with the posting statutes’ legislative history and with most states’
strongly professed policy of promoting hunting.136
Construing the posting statutes as they must be construed,
137
however, creates at least one possible constitutional problem:
takings. This is the second possible argument for a landowner
wishing to challenge the statutes. The Takings Clause of
the U.S. Constitution138 and many similar clauses of state

134. North Dakota Brief, supra note 8, at 5.
135. Wetzel, supra note 2.
136. See, for example, the prohunting stance of most state wildlife agencies, Eric Biber,
Exploring Regulatory Options for Controlling the Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species to the
United States, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 406 n.184 (1999), state constitutional provisions
safeguarding the right to hunt, N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 27; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 26, and recent
statutes that prohibit hunter harassment, Jeffrey S. Thiede, Comment, Aiming for
Constitutionality in the First Amendment Forest: An Analysis of Hunter Harassment Statutes, 48
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1023–26 (1999).
137. Another possible constitutional argument is that substantive due process may require a
form of intermediate scrutiny when the government abolishes certain “core” common law
rights. See Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 14–15 (making this argument). As Justice Marshall
stated,
I do not understand the Court to suggest . . . that there is no federal constitutional
barrier to the abrogation of common-law rights by Congress or a state
government. . . . Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature
attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in some general way.
Indeed, our cases demonstrate that there are limits on governmental authority to
abolish “core” common-law rights, including rights against trespass, at least without a
compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy.
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93–94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It is certainly arguable that allowing hunters unfettered
access to private land is not a compelling need. See infra Part III.B. However, the Court has
avoided delving into such a confused issue as when the abrogation of the common law right
against trespass, or the abrogation of any other common law right, has violated substantive due
process. In light of this confusion, and in light of the possible nonexistence of a common law
right against trespassing hunters, see supra text accompanying notes 121–27, the argument seems
unlikely to persuade a state court. In addition, the argument, to a large extent, is coextensive
with the takings argument: if a taking is found to exist, the posting statute will be
unconstitutional; if not, the posting statute will be constitutional.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause has applied to the states since the Supreme
Court incorporated it into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied it to a state statute. See Pa.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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139
constitutions forbid the taking of private property without just
compensation. The Supreme Court has analyzed takings claims as
140
either regulatory or physical: physical takings can be either per se
physical takings or compensable physical invasions.141 In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,142 the Court defined a per se
physical taking as one that destroys all of a landowner’s property
143
rights, including the rights to possess, use, and exclude. Despite this
language, which seems to suggest that a landowner must lose all of
these property rights to show a per se physical taking, the Court in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission144 firmly stated that simply
requiring a landowner to cede a permanent public easement
constitutes such a taking:

We think a “permanent physical occupation” has occurred, for
purposes of [the Loretto] rule, where individuals are given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real
property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the
145
premises.

Consistent with Nollan, the Court has elsewhere stated that a physical
146
invasion of “only” an easement requires compensation and that
governmental authorization of others’ physical invasion is sufficient
147
for a takings claim. The posting statutes force landowners to grant

139. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22.
140. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); see
Rebecca E. Harrison, Comment, When Animals Invade and Occupy: Physical Takings and the
Endangered Species Act, 78 WASH. L. REV. 867, 875–76 (2003) (summarizing Supreme Court
takings jurisprudence as dividing takings law into regulatory takings, per se physical takings, and
compensable physical invasions).
141. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434–35.
142. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
143. Id. at 435–36.
144. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
145. Id. at 832. The Court’s analysis of whether this particular easement constituted a taking
was more complex because the plaintiff was required to grant the easement only as a condition
for receiving a building permit. Id. at 834–37. The Court here, however, was simply stating that
requiring an owner to grant an easement in the absence of such conditions would certainly be a
taking. See also Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 18–19 (making this argument).
146. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
147. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 n.9.
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148
easements to the public, so they would seem to constitute takings
under Nollan.
Nevertheless, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council149 held that even severe limitations on property rights are not
takings so long as they are not “newly legislated or decreed” but
rather “inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place
150
upon land ownership.” The Court even specifically stated that “we
assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent
easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the landowner’s
title.”151
Thus, the holding in Lucas would focus the inquiry on the extent
to which a hunting easement was a preexisting limitation upon a
landowner’s title. This is another form of the same question, stated
152
above, of whether the common law provides landowners with a civil
trespass remedy against people hunting on their unposted land. That
is, if the common law does not provide such a remedy, the hunting
easement is a “background principle” of state property law, and if the
common law does provide a remedy, the hunting easement is not a
“background principle.” As noted above, this is an open question.
But given that a court would likely seek a reason to uphold a posting
statute, and given that many of the state posting statutes are nearly as
old as the states themselves, such a court would likely conclude that

148. Easements for hunters which stretch over landowners’ entire property are larger than
that in Nollan, which was only, at most, ten feet wide. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 853–54 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Although landowners can temporarily “remove” the easements by posting, posting
can be difficult and expensive, and signs can fall off or be removed. See Hearing, supra note 11
(statements of Anna Marsob and Nancy Laizure) (describing how difficult posting can be);
supra Part II.A (noting the exacting requirements of many posting statutes). In addition, the
actual physical space occupied by the required signs could itself be thought of as an easement,
so that the easement is actually permanent. See Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 20 (making this
argument). If a court were to consider the easement merely temporary, however, it is even more
likely that the court would uphold the posting statute authorizing the easement given that
temporary physical invasions are considered less egregious than permanent ones. See Loretto,
458 U.S. at 435 n.12 (“[T]emporary limitations [on the right to exclude] are subject to a more
complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking.”).
149. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
150. Id. at 1029.
151. Id. at 1028–29. For this proposition, the Court cited Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141
(1900), which held that the government’s navigational servitude on a private landowner’s
interest in submerged land was not a taking, partly because that servitude was preexisting. Id. at
143.
152. See supra notes 121–27 and accompanying text.
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the public’s right to hunt on private land, absent posting, was a
153
preexisting easement on a landowner’s title.
Therefore, the two legal arguments that landowners can assert
against the posting statutes likely would be unsuccessful under
current legal doctrine. Despite this result, as the next Section shows,
social changes since the founding of this country have only increased
the prejudice to landowners’ rights, to the extent that the posting
statutes should be repealed or modified.
B. The Posting Statutes in Light of Changes in Society
The posting statutes were designed to balance the rights of two
different groups: hunters and landowners. For many Americans,
hunting is an almost sacred activity, one enshrined in the national
culture. For these people, the posting statutes surely seem a
reasonable compromise. For others, the posting statutes unfairly
eviscerate the rights of landowners for an insufficiently important
purpose. Although the posting statutes, when originally conceived,
may indeed have struck a reasonable compromise, social changes
over the last several hundred years have altered the balance to an
unfortunate degree, unfairly increasing the burden on landowners.
Specifically, the need to hunt has been eliminated, and the impact on
certain landowners—especially those who dislike hunting—has
greatly increased. As the Supreme Court has recently underscored,
when the reason for a rule no longer exists, the rule may (or should)
no longer apply.154
One of the most dramatic social changes from the early days of
America is that today almost no Americans rely on subsistence
hunting. In the post–Industrial Revolution era of twenty-four-hour
grocery stores, it is a rare sight indeed to see someone hunting for
survival. In addition, hunting has become a middle- and upper-class

153. This conclusion is equally damning to the additional argument that the requirement of
posting signs itself is a taking, no matter how small or unobtrusive the signs may be. See supra
note 148.
154. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (“Cessante ratione legis cessat ipse lex.”
(quoting 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *70b)); see also
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897):
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past.

SIGMON FINAL.DOC

2004]

HUNTING AND POSTING ON PRIVATE LAND

6/6/2005 10:38 AM

575

155
pastime. The number of hunters per capita has also substantially
decreased: even since 1955—a good seventy-five years after the
Industrial Revolution and well into the era of specialized labor and
the decline of family-owned farms—the number of hunters in
America has increased by only 31 percent, whereas the population
has increased by 71 percent.156 In fact, from 1996 to 2001 the number
of hunters actually decreased by nearly 7 percent to around 13
million, about 6 percent of the total U.S. population.157 Hunting
158
arguably remains a wildlife management tool, but it is clear that
hunting today is not a necessity so much as a recreation. Although
contemporary hunters may at times evoke (and invoke) early
American imagery of populist hunting, early America has long since
vanished.
Societal attitudes toward animals in general have undergone a
major transformation. At the founding of the country, there were
159
almost no animal-rights activists, or even vegetarians. This is not to
say that early Americans cared nothing about animal welfare; indeed,

155. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2001 NAT’L SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING, AND WILDLIFEASSOCIATED RECREATION 30 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. SURVEY] (finding that more than half of
all hunters come from households earning over forty thousand dollars per year), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/fhw01-us.pdf.
156. Id. at 6. The number of anglers, however, increased faster than the rate of population
growth. Id.
157. Id. app. B at B-5.
158. The extent to which hunting is necessary in this regard is a topic of lively debate. See
Andrew Daire, The Right to Pursue Game vs. The Government’s Right to the Conservation of
Wildlife, 10 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 115, 117–19 (2003) (detailing the disagreement). Compare M.
Nils Peterson, An Approach for Demonstrating the Social Legitimacy of Hunting, 32 WILDLIFE
SOC’Y BULL. 310, 310 (2004) (arguing that hunting is a vital wildlife management tool), with
Jacqueline Tresl, Shoot First, Talk Later: Blowing Holes in Freedom of Speech, 8 ANIMAL L.
177, 179 (2002) (expressing doubt about the wildlife management rationale), and THE FUND
FOR ANIMALS, HUNTING FACT SHEET #1, at 1 (Sept. 14, 2002) (arguing that “wildlife
management” is an invalid justification for hunting and pointing out statements of the New
Jersey Division of Fish, Game, and Wildlife to the effect that state wildlife management is solely
geared
toward
providing
animals
for
recreational
hunting),
available
at
http://fund.org/uploads/fs_hunt1.pdf.
159. Cf. HARVEY A. LEVENSTEIN, REVOLUTION AT THE TABLE: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE AMERICAN DIET 4 (1988) (noting that during the first half of the nineteenth century
“people on both sides of the British North Atlantic were carnivores of the first order”). See
generally M. Varn Chandola, Dissecting American Animal Protection Law: Healing the Wounds
with Animal Rights and Eastern Enlightenment, 8 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 12–21 (Winter 2002)
(discussing the historical and philosophical views of animals in the West); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506, 1513–26 (2001)
(reviewing STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS
(2000)).
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many early Americans were quite concerned with the transportation
and labor benefits that animals provided, and some were concerned
with ecosystem management and the continued existence of animals
160
as a source for subsistence hunting. Rather, early American
attitudes toward animals were simply what one would expect of a
young, rural country at that moment in history: pragmatic and not
concerned with high-minded idealism that considered the killing of
animals in any way immoral.
Over the past two centuries, however, American attitudes toward
animals have changed, undoubtedly in part by virtue of the
elimination of the need to hunt—or even to eat meat, as some have
argued.161 Organizations such as the Humane Society of the United
States or the more radical People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA) have arisen to safeguard animal rights. Some legal
scholars have even argued for a fundamental alteration of the
property status of animals.162 Eminent twentieth-century figures, such
as Mahatma Gandhi, have fervently advocated vegetarianism for
163
moral reasons. Bruce G. Friedrich, a PETA official, has argued,
quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., that “the arc of history is long, but
that it bends towards justice,” so that one day people will look back
on meat-eaters as they now do on slave owners.164 It is true that the
majority of Americans are not vegetarians, and that sentiments such
as those of Gandhi and, especially, of Friedrich are not widely
shared.165 The point, however, is that some people now have these
views, and that for them the matter is quite clear, no matter how
radical the majority of Americans may find their views.

160. See LUND, supra note 20, at 28–31 (noting various wildlife statutes enacted to ensure
the usefulness and continued existence of animals).
161. See Richard Corliss, Should We All Be Vegetarians?, TIME, July 15, 2002, at 48, 48–56
(summarizing the debate regarding whether eating meat is necessary and whether a vegetarian
diet is healthy).
162. See, e.g., David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473, 476
(2000) (arguing that the legal and equitable components of living property can and should be
severed, with the equitable component being vested in animals themselves); Nussbaum, supra
note 159, at 1511–13 (advocating substantial change in the legal status of animals and providing
a theoretical framework for such change).
163. Mahatma Gandhi, The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism, Address at a Social
Meeting of the London Vegetarian Society (Nov. 20, 1931), available at
http://www.ivu.org/news/evu/other/gandhi2.html.
164. Bruce G. Friedrich, Preface to VASU MURTI, THEY SHALL NOT HURT OR DESTROY:
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND VEGETARIANISM IN THE WESTERN RELIGIOUS TRADITION v, vi (1999).
165. Corliss, supra note 161, at 51–52.
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Moreover, even the average American’s attitude toward animals
has greatly changed. Many Americans are now members of the
mainstream Humane Society and local pet rescue clubs.
Vegetarianism, although not a majority practice, has been increasing
in popularity and is no longer an “odd” or “radical” choice, with
many vegetarians choosing not to eat meat out of concern for animal
166
welfare. Many people who do not hunt now enjoy simply watching
wildlife, whether at a state park or outside of their own windows.
Perhaps the best example of changing attitudes is overseas, in
England, where at the turn of the millennium the centuries-old sport
of foxhunting with dogs came under attack and was banned, after
already having been banned in Scotland.167 Although this Note deals
with America, the example of English foxhunting demonstrates the
plausibility that the majority of Americans will one day disfavor
hunting.168 In the end, however, it is sufficient to say that American
attitudes toward animals have changed, and that a significant number
of contemporary Americans would not want animals killed on their
land. Some people, especially hunters, surely would disagree with
these sentiments, but the sentiments exist nonetheless.
Another major social shift in the last several hundred years has
been the shift to smaller land parcels and suburbanization. At
America’s founding, the country was predominantly rural, with plenty
169
of large tracts and room for expansion. Parcels of land were
generally large. During the twentieth century, however—and
especially during the latter half of that century—the American
population became increasingly suburban and decreasingly rural.170 In

166. Id.
167. Christopher Adams, PM Faces Long Court Battle as Hunting Ban Is Forced into Law,
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 19, 2004, at 4; Alison Hardie, Boxing Day Hunt on Its Last Legs?,
THE SCOTSMAN, Dec. 27, 2003, at 3. Hunting foxes with the aid of dogs is the most popular
method of fox hunting and has the deepest historical roots.
168. National Geographic wonders whether foxhunting—which some people might consider
more harmful to animal rights than other forms of hunting, such as deer hunting, that at least
yield food—might come under attack in the United States. Laura Howden, Is U.S. Safe from
Foxhunting
Debate?,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS
(May
31,
2002),
at
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/05/0530_020532_fox.html (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
169. Cf. LUND, supra note 20, at 19–34 (describing the geography as it related to hunting in
early America).
170. FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS
IN
THE
20TH
CENTURY
32–33
(2002),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf.

SIGMON FINAL.DOC

578

6/6/2005 10:38 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:549
171

1910, only 7.1 percent of the population lived in suburban areas
whereas 72 percent lived in rural areas.172 By 2000, 50 percent of
173
Americans resided in suburban areas, and the rural population had
174
dropped to 20 percent. Unlike the early days of the nation, then,
modern America is predominantly urban and suburban—with half of
the country owning small- to medium-sized plots on the edge of a
metropolis, adjacent to farm country.
Another change in America is the existence of modern,
commercial hunting preserves. Whether a result of increased
suburbanization, modern hunting’s recreational nature, or the
increasingly middle-class demographic of hunters (many of whom
175
want an organized, vacation-like experience), private land available
176
for hunting now exists all over the nation. And the majority of
hunting in America takes place on private land—in 2001, 74 percent
177
of hunting days were on private land, and hunters spent $371
million on trip-related private land-use fees and $4 billion on private
178
land leases/purchases for hunting. As a result, the recreational
activity of hunting can now be a source of income for landowners.179
It is within the context of these social changes that the posting
statutes and the collision of rights they generate must be analyzed.
The most significant social change is that hunting is no longer a
necessity. This fact alone seems sufficient to justify the assertion that
the posting statutes harm landowners’ property rights in order to
serve a relatively insignificant purpose—facilitating one small group’s
recreational pursuit.
Almost equally important is that the degree of harm to
landowners’ property rights has increased because of landowners’

171. Id. at 33 fig.1-15.
172. Id. at 32 fig.1-14.
173. Id. at 33 fig.1-15.
174. Id. at 32 fig.1-14.
175. See supra notes 155, 169–74 and accompanying text.
176. EDWARD
L.
KOZICKY,
HUNTING
PRESERVES
III-A
11,
at
http://wildlife.tamu.edu/publications/ a075.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
177. U.S. SURVEY, supra note 155, at 80 tbl.28.
178. Id. at 73 tbl.18.
179. See, e.g., RURAL ENTERPRISE & ALTERNATIVE DEV. INITIATIVE, ILL. COUNCIL ON
FOOD & AGRIC. RESEARCH & S. ILL. UNIV. CARBONDALE, REP. NO. 2, ALTERNATIVE
AGRICULTURE: CAN FEE HUNTING INCREASE YOUR BOTTOM LINE? 1–4 (2001) (detailing how
landowners can make money from charging hunters fees to hunt on their land), available at
http://www.siu.edu/~readi/grains/ factsheets/hunting.pdf.
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changing attitudes toward animals; that is, especially for people who
consider the killing of animals morally wrong, but also for people who
would simply prefer to observe or enjoy the presence of wildlife, the
diminution of their right to exclude has become more egregious than
it was in early America. Regardless of whether people opposed to the
killing of animals are in the mainstream, for many of them it is a
significant insult to have animals killed on their land. Some people
might even want to use their land as a sanctuary for animals, and the
posting statutes make achieving that goal difficult, if not impossible.
Put simply, people have the freedom of conscience to think what they
will about animal rights and hunting, and for those whose consciences
dictate that animals should not be killed, their right to exclude
hunters from their land becomes paramount.
The degree of harm to landowners’ property interests has also
increased because the posting statutes make it more difficult for
landowners who wish to allow hunting on their land for a fee—
whether in the form of a lease or a one-time, informal payment—to
do so. This is true for two reasons. First, to charge hunters a fee,
landowners must post their land properly—otherwise hunters can
simply enter without permission. As previously noted, proper posting
can be difficult, if not impossible; or at the very least it requires a
180
good deal of expense and effort. Second, the existence of other
unposted or improperly posted land, which hunters can enter without
charge, makes it less likely that hunters will pay for the privilege of
hunting on the land of a private landowner who wants to charge a fee.
Landowners have made and will continue to make money from
allowing hunters to hunt on their land, but laws requiring individual
landowners to post make this endeavor substantially more difficult.
In addition, the increasing suburbanization of America means
that one traditional problem with the now-recreational activity of
hunting—accidental injuries—affects nonhunters more closely than
before.181 According to the International Hunter Education
Association, in the United States between 1994 and 2001 there was an
average of at least 993 hunting casualties per year, with an average of
180. See supra notes 13–15, 68–69 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Rick Barrett, Neighbors Oppose Hunt Plan for Land: Safety Concerns Raised
in Town of Delafield, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 1, 2002, at B1 (noting citizen concerns
about a proposed hunting area near suburban developments). But see Bob Hodge, Deer, Deer:
A Wise-Acre Decision Turns Political, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL (Knoxville, TN), Feb. 13,
2000, at C8 (discussing the Tennessee Wildlife Resource Agency’s argument that hunting near
suburbs poses few risks to hunters).
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at least 91 fatal casualties. Most casualties affect hunters themselves,
but accidental shootings of hikers, bird watchers, and even suburban
183
residents at home are not uncommon. As the suburbs expand, laws
allowing hunters to enter smaller, private tracts will only increase the
number of accidental injuries. Suburban landowners should be given
the choice of whether to allow this danger.184
Thus, while it is arguable that the posting statutes have always
required too great a sacrifice of landowners, that sacrifice has only
grown more severe for some and now serves a significantly less
important purpose than it did historically. The next Part suggests a
change.
IV. SOLUTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
This Note has shown that, given the social changes since the
formulation of state posting statutes, the statutes tip the balance
between hunters’ rights and landowners’ rights too far in favor of
hunters. Despite the probable lack of any judicial remedy, legislatures

182. These data are extrapolated from annual reports issued by the organization from 1994
to 2001. See Int’l Hunter Educ. Assoc., Annual Reports of Hunting and Hunting Related
Incidents, at http://www.ihea.com/docs/Incident_Reports1 (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal). These numbers are certainly conservative because not every state
reports, and presumably not every incident is reported. See, e.g., id. (noting the states for which
data are unavailable at the top of each table of incident statistics). The statistics also include
Canada, but in the few years for which the Canadian data is separable from the American data,
Canada accounts for only a miniscule number of the total casualties. See, e.g., id. (documenting
that casualties from Canadian incidents numbered only 39 of 1181 in 1994, 41 of 1242 in 1995,
and 40 of 1019 in 1997).
183. See, e.g., Matt Crawford, Charges ‘Unlikely’ in Freak Shooting, BURLINGTON FREE
PRESS (Burlington, VT), Nov. 24, 2003, at A1 (describing an incident in which a man was killed
by a hunter while watching football in his home); Jingle Davis, Hunters, Hikers Will Still Share
Trail, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 26, 2002, at 4A (describing an incident in which a hunter killed
a hiker on the Appalachian Trail); Widow Seeks Hunter-Education Rule, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept.
22, 2003, at B4 (describing the efforts of a widow whose husband was mistaken for an elk and
killed).
184. It is true that increasing suburbanization and the resulting small parcels mean fewer
suburban landowners are able to hunt entirely on their own land. Furthermore, suburbanization
makes requiring affirmative permission from landowners more onerous than it once would have
been, because it means that more landowners must be contacted. But nothing prevents avid
suburban hunters from purchasing or leasing nonsuburban land, or visiting free public tracts of
nonsuburban land, on which to hunt. In any case, a somewhat increased burden on hunting does
not change the facts mentioned above—most notably, that hunting is now a recreation, albeit an
important one for certain people, that heavily burdens some landowners and infringes upon
their property rights. Finally, even if suburban landowners are more fearful of hunters than the
statistics justify, the irrational nature of their fear is no reason to destroy their property rights.
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have the ability to change the law. It is on such change this Note now
focuses.
A. Remedies at the State Level
To adequately protect landowners’ rights, state legislatures in the
185
twenty-seven states that have posting statutes should take the
simple step of repealing those statutes and enacting new statutes
requiring affirmative landowner consent for hunters wishing to hunt
on private land. These new statutes could take either the larger step
of clearly criminalizing all trespass on private property and providing
a civil remedy or the smaller step of retaining the posting requirement
but making it clear that this requirement operates only to criminalize
trespass, without destroying landowners’ right to sue civilly for
trespass on unposted land.186
Short of repealing the posting statutes, state legislatures could
take other, lesser actions that would alleviate the injury done to
landowners’ property rights. For instance, states could retain their
posting statutes for all forms of recreation except hunting, on the
rationale that hunters are more prevalent and dangerous than
participants in other recreational activities, and that they may inflict
greater damage on property rights because certain landowners are
187
This strategy—which, in fact,
morally opposed to hunting.
188
Connecticut has adopted —would allow states to provide protection
for hikers, sightseers, and other people involved in recreational

185. As previously noted, the nonstatutory posting requirements of Maine and Louisiana
are similar to the statutory posting requirements of the twenty-seven states with posting
statutes. See supra note 67. Thus, although Maine and Louisiana obviously cannot repeal any
statute to remedy this problem, they can follow the other suggestions in this Part—for instance,
they can enact statutes to explicitly require that hunters obtain landowner consent before
hunting on private land.
186. See supra notes 116–20 and accompanying text (discussing Rod Froelich’s argument
that courts should construe the posting statute to apply only to criminal trespass, rather than to
abrogate a landowner’s common law civil remedy). Although this Note has argued that such an
argument seems flawed, largely because of the clear history and legislative intent of the statutes,
see supra notes 121–36 and accompanying text, it certainly would be feasible and reasonable for
state legislatures to “override” this history and intent to make clear that the statutes apply only
to criminal sanctions.
187. See supra notes 159–68 and accompanying text.
188. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 26-65(b) (West 1999) (requiring landowner consent to hunt
on private land); id. § 53a-109 (West 1990) (establishing criminal trespass liability for entering
any land, posted or unposted, for the purpose of hunting, but requiring posting or fencing to
establish liability for entry for other purposes). Other states that require affirmative consent to
hunt on private land may also have posting statutes for nonhunting trespassers.
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activities. States could also make posting easier, for example, by
allowing landowners to post a single notice at the county courthouse,
189
online, or in some other database. Doing so would eliminate the
expense and effort of posting, as well as the problem of signs’ falling
down or being torn down; it would also make it simple for hunters to
verify that land on which they intended to hunt was open to hunting.
Neither of these solutions would irreparably harm hunting.
Twenty-one states already have statutes that require affirmative
190
and there is no evidence that hunting is
consent to hunt,
unreasonably difficult in any of those states. Those states are not
geographically concentrated in any way: hunting requires affirmative
landowner permission in Midwestern states such as South Dakota; in
large, game-filled states such as Texas; in Southern states such as
Tennessee; and in Mid-Atlantic states such as Delaware.191 If states
remained concerned about the availability of land for hunting, they
could either create more incentives for private landowners to open
their land to hunting—possibly with the help of the federal
government192—or increase access to public land for hunting by
purchasing more land or by easing restrictions on existing public land.
Such a solution would preserve the integrity both of private land
ownership and of hunting.
B. Remedies at the Municipal Level
Municipalities, as entities distinct from states, could also take
action to remedy the imbalance between hunters’ and private
landowners’ rights. Specifically, municipalities could take the same
measures mentioned above: requiring landowner permission to hunt
on private land or modifying the posting statutes.193

189. North Carolina, for instance, had an easier posting requirement dating back to colonial
times and into the nineteenth century. See 2 WILLIAM T. DORTCH ET AL., THE CODE OF
NORTH CAROLINA § 2831 (1883) (codifying a 1784 statute, 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 33 § 5, that
required posting only in “two or more public places” and amended an earlier colonial statute to
require that posting be done “at the court house door of the county”). North Carolina’s current
posting statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-159.7 (2003), was added in 1949 and requires posting of
land in a manner similar to the posting statutes of other states, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 887; see
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part II.A (discussing the relevant statutes of every state).
191. See supra note 65 (listing the statutes of states requiring affirmative landowner
consent).
192. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
193. In addition, municipalities could take a further step, which some have already done:
ban hunting within municipal limits, on the rationale that hunting is unacceptably dangerous in
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Municipalities do face one impediment if they decide to take
such action—preemption. The regulation of firearms (including
ownership restrictions and licensing) is a field that states have
traditionally occupied completely, thus preempting any municipal
194
ordinances in conflict with state law. The traditional regulation of
firearms by states, however, does not necessarily mean that
municipalities could not ban or further regulate firearm discharges
within municipal limits; some states allow municipalities to do so.195
Nor does the traditional regulation of firearms by states necessarily
mean that municipalities could not ban hunting or regulate it more
than states have done, regardless of any apparent limits on municipal
regulation of firearms or firearm discharges—some states may only
preempt their municipalities when it comes to regulations like
ownership restrictions and licensing. The law on preemption is very
unclear, principally because few states have statutes or clear judicial
opinions on the issue; for the most part, the preemption issue is
decided by state game departments or attorneys general after
municipalities attempt to regulate hunting in some fashion. Thus,
state law varies widely.196

municipalities (states could also ban hunting in municipalities based on the same rationale). See,
e.g., WEST DES MOINES, IOWA, CITY CODE § 5-2-7-5 (2003) (banning hunting generally, but
allowing hunting of certain birds under certain conditions), available at
http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/IA/West%20Des%20Moines/index.htm. The desirability of
flatly banning hunting in such a manner, however, is outside the scope of this Note.
194. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-11.7-103 (2003). See generally Legal Cmty. Against
Violence, Master List of Firearms Policies, at http://www.firearmslawcenter.org (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing generally the preemption issue
and describing each state’s applicable law). This generally means that municipalities cannot ban
firearms or create alternative licensing schemes. Id.
195. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.633(a) (West 2001).
196. It appears that some states disallow ordinances relating to firearm discharges and
hunting, whereas others allow them. The attorney general of Tennessee, for instance, has stated
that, in the current absence of express state legislative authorization for municipalities to restrict
firearm discharges within municipal limits, municipalities cannot enact ordinances restricting
hunters from discharging firearms within city limits when such hunters are otherwise abiding by
state hunting laws. Conflict Between State Authorized Hunting and Municipal Prohibition on
Firearm Discharges, Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. No. 98-038 (1998). Apparently, New Jersey forbids
municipalities from passing ordinances that generally regulate hunting. See Aimee J. Frank,
Animal Trapping Ban on Hold, DAILY FREEMAN (New York), Sept. 13, 2003, at A3 (describing
how New Paltz’s town attorney advised the town that a proposed ordinance banning certain
types of traps likely conflicted with comprehensive state hunting laws). In Vermont,
municipalities can ban firearm discharges within municipal limits but, pursuant to the state
constitutional provision protecting the right to hunt, municipalities cannot ban other forms of
hunting. Isaac Olson, Town Forest to Be Posted, CALEDONIAN-RECORD (Vermont), Nov. 13,
2003, at 1. Texas allows municipalities individually to decide whether hunting is allowed in city
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The issue of whether and to what extent municipalities can ban
or regulate hunting is, of course, a secondary issue; the main issue is
whether and to what extent municipalities can create ordinances that
require affirmative landowner consent for hunting on private land. In
municipalities banning hunting generally, this is not an issue. In
municipalities that could but have not yet banned hunting generally,
it seems—although this is not certain—that they could enact this
“lesser” restriction. In municipalities unable to ban hunting outright
but able to regulate it, whether ordinances that further “regulate”
hunting by requiring affirmative landowner consent would be
considered reasonable remains an open question. Even in
municipalities unable to ban hunting outright or in any way regulate
it, this question remains open inasmuch as an ordinance requiring
affirmative landowner permission to hunt could plausibly be called a
regulation or enforcement regarding private property rights and
trespass law, not a regulation regarding hunting.
It is clear that any municipal ordinance would be inferior to a
state remedy because the ordinance would only apply to one
municipality—generally a small area when compared to a state. It
would be time-consuming and inefficient for each individual
municipality to try to guarantee private landowner rights. In addition,
with the preemption issue hanging in the background, a statewide
solution would also be preferable given the unquestionable power of
states to change their posting statutes. Nonetheless, if state
legislatures prove unwilling or unable to change their laws,
municipalities can and should act.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-nine states currently require private landowners to post
their land to exclude hunters, twenty-seven of these states by statute.
The posting statutes were an outgrowth of the American desire to
ensure that hunting was available to everyone, not just the rich and
landed. The statutes vary widely in their particulars, but the core idea
behind them—that landowners must take often onerous steps to

limits; San Antonio allows hunting, Houston and Dallas do not. Don Sapatkin, Deer Hunters
Quietly Active in City, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 13, 2003, at B1. The situation is similar in Iowa,
where municipalities can ban all hunting, selectively ban certain types of hunting, and enact
related ordinances. See, e.g., WEST DES MOINES, IOWA, CITY CODE § 5-2-7-5 (allowing hunting
of specific birds under certain conditions but banning hunting generally and, consistent with
Iowa state law, requiring affirmative landowner consent to hunt on private land).
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ensure that hunters do not enter their land—exists in all twenty-seven
statutes. Whatever the merits of these statutes when first formulated,
as a result of social changes they now unfairly privilege hunters over
landowners. Because judicial remedy of this problem seems unlikely,
state legislatures should alter their statutes to require landowner
permission to hunt on private land. Failing state legislation,
municipalities could take action, although the reach of municipal
ordinances would be limited and the potential for state law
preemption presents a substantial danger. It is time for states and
cities to recognize that American society has changed.

